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Financing Choices of Firms in EU Accession Countries 
 
Abstract 
The paper presents evidence of actual and target capital structures of firms in five EU 
accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Estonia). We consider the financial constraints of 
private companies and compare the level of indebtedness and the determinants firms’ choices 
of capital structure in selected EU accession countries and EU countries. A dynamic non-
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I. Introduction 
 
Enterprise restructuring and financial system reforms have been core issues for transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002). Indeed, creating appropriate incentive structures for firms and banks has proven to be 
one of the most challenging tasks of reform. The failures and shortcomings of these reforms 
during the first decade of economic transformation resulted in substantial fiscal costs and 
forgone economic growth for most of the economies in the region, and has thus made the 
“accession readiness” of enterprises in these countries a focal concern in the forthcoming 
expansion of the EU (Carlin et al., 1999).  
Access of firms to finance in transition economies, a central discussion in reform of the 
enterprise and bank sectors, has had two aspects. On one hand, market reforms have been 
expected to impose hard-budget constraints on the loss-making state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and include such corrective measures as the elimination of “soft” credits from banks 
to firms and breaking up the collusion between banks and firms. On the other hand, most 
transition economies have continued to lack the medium- and long-term finance needed for 
restructuring and growth of most private companies. Corporate credit and capital markets 
remained thin, segmented and underdeveloped by western standards in the most transition 
countries throughout the 1990s. In general, measures to solve the problems of SOEs and 
banks did not include efforts at alleviating financial constraints on private firms. 
This paper attempts to gain some insights into the financial constraints facing private 
companies in transition economies and hopefully shed light on how the characteristics of 
firms in accession countries compare with firms in EU countries. We present evidence about 
the relative importance of equity, debt, and inter-firm financing for a large and diverse set of 
enterprises from five transition economies using a panel of firms from Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Poland and Romania. These countries represent diverse geographical parts 
of Europe: Central and Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe and the Baltic Region. More 
importantly, these countries have had different experiences and degrees of success with 
market reforms. In addition to covering the representative cross-section of firms, our dataset 
spans a reasonably long period from 1997 to 2001. 
The novelty of the paper is an adoption of a dynamic modelling framework to analyze 
the determinants of the target capital structures for the companies. The model allows 
accounting for transaction costs that impede the adjustment of the capital structure of a firm 
towards its desired capital structure. The transaction costs of altering capital structure are 
often ignored in the existing finance literature, i.e. most papers accept Modigliani-Miller   4
Proposition I, which assumes that transaction costs are second order (Miller and Modigliani, 
1958). One might expect, however, that transaction costs play a more important role in 
transition economies relative to industrialized ones due to less developed financial systems 
and persistent supply-side market imperfections. 
We use a non-linear dynamic adjustment model and explicitly model the adjustment of 
a firm’s leverage to a target leverage, assumed to be the desired one. This target leverage is 
explained by a set of factors. The introduction of an endogenous adjustment factor and target 
leverage, in turn, helps avoid the shortcomings of many capital structure studies. First, these 
studies explain the variation in observed leverage, while theoretical models relate to optimal 
(target) capital structure. Second, most studies do not attempt to capture the nature of dynamic 
capital structure adjustments. 
The literature on choice of capital structure in transition economies was fairly limited 
until recently. Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997) and Cornelli, Portes and Schaffer (1998) 
document surprisingly low levels of leverage for firms in Poland and Hungary in the first half 
of 1990s. Both papers examine the determinants of capital structure and conclude that the low 
levels of debt financing are most likely a supply-side phenomenon. Nivorozhkin (2002) 
studies developments in the Hungarian capital markets during 1992-1995 and investigates the 
determinants of the capital structures of companies listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
The results support the earlier finding that Hungarian firms were financially constrained. This 
situation apparently was the result of the combination of the financial incentives of firms and 
credit rationing within the financial environment. Revoltella (2001) investigates the effects of 
firm specific variables on indebtedness in the Czech Republic during the first years of 
transition. Supply factors are found to significantly determine the financial choices of 
enterprises. The paper also suggests evidence of a transformation in credit allocation policies. 
Klapper et al (2002) analyze small and medium-size enterprise (SME) financing in Eastern 
Europe in 1999. The authors find that the SME sector comprises relatively young, highly 
leveraged, and relatively profitable firms. The financial constraints are found to impede the 
access of firms to long-term financing and their ability to grow.  
The model similar to the one used in this paper was employed in Nivorozhkin (2003) to 
investigate the dynamics of capital structure of companies in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria 
during 1993-1997. Our paper extends the results of Nivorozhkin (2003) in several important 
dimensions. First, the paper looks at a larger set of countries, which allows more general 
conclusions. Second, the set of explanatory variables is extended to include the ownership 
information of companies. Third, the paper touches upon the determinants of cross-country 
variations in the capital structures of companies. Finally, our paper looks at a different time   5
period, i.e. 1997-2001. The greater macroeconomic stability and synchronization of policies 
for the purpose of EU accession during that period adds credibility to the cross-country 
comparison and makes the analysis somewhat policy oriented.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide some 
background information on the transition economies investigated in the paper. In section 3, 
we look at the relative indebtedness of firms in different countries and analyze the 
determinants of observed differences. In section 4, we describe the dynamic adjustment model 
of capital structure. In section 5, we proceed with the selection of dependent and explanatory 
variables of the model. Section 6 contains the discussion of the data set and estimation 
procedure. In section 7, we describe the results of the dynamic adjustment model estimation. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
 




Bulgaria made very slow progress in reforms throughout most of the 1990s. Weak financial 
discipline and poor corporate governance of Bulgarian firms and banks led to widespread 
asset stripping and insider lending in the first half of 1990s. General economic instability and 
ineffective recapitalization helped precipitate a major financial crisis in 1996-1997. 
In the wake of the crisis and the post-crisis period, measures to promote financial 
discipline and create incentives for restructuring have been fairly ineffective due to weak 
bankruptcy law, insider ownership, underdeveloped markets for corporate control and the lack 
of new commercial credit (EBRD, 2000). 
In 1996, the Bulgarian authorities launched a program of liquidation and rehabilitation 
of the largest loss-making state-owned enterprises, which were responsible for most of the 
losses. The program was largely completed by mid-2000. Bulgarian mass privatization started 
in late 1996, and 78 % of state-owned assets (excluding infrastructure) had been sold to the 
public by the end of 2000. 
Since 1997, the Bulgarian banking sector has experienced consolidation and 
improvements in regulation and supervision. Privatization of banks encountered setbacks, but 
nevertheless was nearly complete by 2001, when only three banks remained in state 
ownership. Bank intermediation remained limited in the post-crisis period. As a result, the 
domestic credit to the private sector averaged only 13.62 % of GDP during 1997-2000. Banks   6
were unwilling to engage actively in commercial lending, despite the efforts of the Bulgarian 
authorities to strengthen creditors’ rights and simplify collateral collection. 
The role of the Bulgarian securities market has remained limited since its establishment. 
Despite a large number of listed companies on Bulgarian Stock Exchange, the trading 
volumes have been very low. The first corporate bond issues took place in 1999.  
 
 
The Czech Republic 
 
Czech privatization occurred in two waves in 1992 and 1995. The second wave of the Czech 
Republic’s voucher privatization program boosted the share of the domestic product 
generated by the private sector to 70 %. Large-scale privatization was revived in 2000 and 
increased the private sector share of GDP to 80 %. 
While generally considered a successful transition economy, the Czech Republic has 
faced problems similar to less-advanced countries in the area of enterprise and banking sector 
reform. In 1999, inefficient bankruptcy law and poor enforcement resulted in over 3,000 
bankruptcy cases pending in the courts, over 10,000 companies were technically insolvent and 
about one-third of Czech companies were estimated to have overdue debts (EBRD, 2000). 
The government gained some traction on the problem of insolvency of large industrial 
conglomerates in the late 1990s, only to encounter fiscal pressure as the amount of state 
guarantees increased. Some of the government’s liability arose from indirect guarantees on 
bad loans placed with the Consolidation Bank. 
A small number of foreign-owned banks came to dominate the sector after privatization 
and consolidation of Czech banks. In mid-2001, after the government sold off the last state-
owned bank, the share of foreign-owned banks exceeded 90 % of total banking assets. Despite 
attempts to clean up the portfolios of banks ahead of privatization, the share of bad loans in 
total loans of the banks remained around 20 % through the late 1990s.            
The Czech Republic’s healthy investment climate resulted in the highest cumulative 
flows of FDI per capita in the region. The share of industrial output produced by foreign-
owned firms increased from 15 % in 1997 to about 40 % in 2001. Positive structural changes 
in the Czech economy in the late 1990s also resulted in strong investment-led growth and 
rising employment. This, in turn, led to a gradual recovery from the 1997 recession. Domestic 
credit to the private sector remained high and on average was 57 % of GDP during 1997-
2000.   7
The role of the Czech securities market represented by the Prague Stock Exchange 
declined during the 1990s. There were no initial public offerings since the stock market was 
established in 1992 and the market did not serve a source of capital for listed companies. The 





Small-scale privatization began in Estonia immediately after the country gained independence 
from Soviet Union in 1991. The following year, large-scale privatization commenced, 
accompanied by liberalization of most consumer prices and introduction of a currency board 
arrangement. The privatization program was structured to attract foreign strategic investment. 
The private sector’s share in GDP increased gradually and reached 70  % in 1996. 
Privatization of industrial companies was largely completed by 1999. 
Successful enterprise reform made Estonia the most competitive transition country by 
1999 (EBRD, 2001). 
The privatization of Estonian banks proceeded briskly after the first state-owned bank 
was privatized in 1995. The share of state bank assets went from zero to 7.8 % in 1998 after 
the re-nationalization of insolvent Optiva bank. State bank assets returned to zero in 2000. 
During 1990s, the banking sector was characterized by active consolidation through mergers 
and by entry of foreign banks. The share of non-performing loans on banks’ books averaged 
just 2.6 % during 1997-2000. The domestic credit to the private sector remained stable and 
averaged at 26 % of GDP during 1997-2000.  
The legal environment for companies constantly improved, and included measures to 
strengthen corporate governance and promote competition.     
The Tallinn stock exchange was established in 1996. By 2000, the stock market 
capitalization had reached 35 % of GDP. The example of a successful floatation was the 




Small-scale privatization in Poland began in 1990 and was followed by a mass privatization in 
1993. Despite a fast pace of privatization, there were still 2,863 state-owned enterprises in 
1998, the assets of which had a book value of 30-35 % of GDP (EBRD, 1998). Indeed, about 
three-quarters of the top Polish companies by turnover were state-owned. Many of state-  8
owned firms were in such critical sectors as defence, coal mining, steel and chemicals. They 
required constant infusion of public funds. Stiff union resistance, demands for redundancy 
compensation and limited interest of strategic investors also impeded privatization and 
restructuring of enterprises until the end of the 1990s. 
Poland’s strong growth during the second part of the 1990s was primarily driven by the 
rapid expansion of the new private sector (mainly SMEs) and large FDI inflows. 
The privatization of Polish banks began in 1993. Bank privatization proceeded rather 
slowly. Restrictions on the entry of foreign banks also limited competition in the banking 
sector. The state-owned banks held over 50 % of total bank assets up to 1998. By 2000, the 
Polish government controlled only two banks and only intervened in the governance of 
privatized banks through its remaining direct or indirect ownership stakes. The banking sector 
consolidated in the late end of 1990s with foreign strategic investors obtaining control of 
about 50 % of banks’ assets. The share of bad loans in total loans of banks decreased from 
around 30 % in the first half of the 1990s to around 13.5 % in the late 1990s. The change 
reflected the policy of the authorities to rehabilitate and recapitalize banks prior to 
privatization. Domestic credit to private sector rose in the second part of 1990s, and averaged 
21.5 % of GDP. 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange was the largest central European bourse at the end of 
1990s. By the end of the 1990s’, its market capitalization approached levels of small EU 
exchanges. The number of listed companies increased to 200 by the end of 2000. Stock 





Despite a mass voucher privatization in 1991, Romania’s progress with privatization was 
much slower than in most other CEE countries. At the end of 1996, over 75 % of assets 
allocated to the State Ownership Fund (SOF) were still owned by the state. The privatization 
of both small and large-scale companies accelerated in 1998 with the sale of 1,015 small and 
medium-sized companies and the sale of telecommunications provider Romtelecom. In 
general, the restructuring and liquidation of loss-making state enterprises has moved at a 
snail’s pace. By the middle of 1998, inter-enterprise and tax arrears amounted to 13 % and 
8 % of GDP, respectively. The government’s problems with enterprise arrears grew over the 
years after several unsuccessful state attempts to deal with them.   9
Bank privatization did not begin until 1998 and proceeded slowly with the share of 
state-owned bank assets exceeding 50  % through the late 1990s. The largest state-owned 
banks were overburdened with non-performing loans, which reached 70 % of total loans for 
some banks. Some 2 % of GDP was allocated for bank restructuring in 1999. Government 
support for banks substantially increased domestic debt. 
Foreign direct investment in Romania remained low relative to other countries of 
Central and Southeastern Europe. The major obstacles were taxes, regulations, policy 
instability and corruption. 




III.  Indebtedness of firms in transition economies  
 
We first look at the average levels of indebtedness of companies in our sample. Leverage, 
measured by the ratio of total debt to the sum of debt and shareholders’ equity, remained quite 
low by western standards throughout the entire period. The cross-country average remained 
stable every year at around 23 %, although the dispersion remained high. The leverage ratios 
ranged from 9 % in Bulgaria in 1997 to 34 % in Estonia in 1998.  The lowest mean values of 
leverage for the period were observed in Bulgaria and Romania (average ratios of 12 % and 
19 %, respectively). Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic were at the top of the range with 
the average indebtedness of 24-31 %. Between 1997 and 2001, the leverage increased in three 
countries with the lowest leverage (Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland) and decreased in two 
countries with the highest leverage (Estonia and the Czech Republic), ranging from a 255 % 
relative increase in Bulgaria to a 20 % decrease in the Czech Republic. The absolute changes 
in leverage between 1997 and 2001 were in the range of 5-8 %. 
Distribution of the leverage of firms remained skewed to the left for all countries during 
the entire period. Indeed, most Bulgarian firms in the sample had no debt in 1997 and 1998. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of companies with no debt decreased over time for all countries 
except the Czech Republic. The largest decreases in the proportion of “debt-free” companies 
were in Bulgaria and Romania, countries with the lowest leverage. Figure 1 illustrates a 
seeming tendency during the observed period for the convergence in capital structures across 
countries: the average indebtedness of firms in the countries with highest leverage decrease, 
while the average indebtedness of firms in the countries with the lower leverage increases.   10
Clearly, the differences in capital structures of firms in the various countries we consider 
(except Bulgaria) had become miniscule by the end of 2001 (see Figure 1).      
None of the evidence presented so far contradicts what has been found for transition 
countries in the first half of 1990s. On average, the leverage of companies in the transition 
countries remained low during the period 1997-2001 and a large proportion of companies 
were not leveraged at all. Nevertheless, the average level of indebtedness of companies in 
advanced transition economies of Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic approached the 
average level of indebtedness of 40 % reported for companies in Germany, France, Italy and 
the UK (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Firm indebtedness seems to change substantially in Poland during the 1990s. Cornelli, 
Portes and Schaffer (1998) report 6  % ratios of total bank debt to assets for Poland and 
Hungary in 1992. The ratio corresponding to the one used in this paper was not reported, but 
we must infer it was somewhat greater.
1 Our results indicate that corporate indebtedness 
substantially increased in Poland during 1990s. The leverage of Czech firms we find is quite 
similar to that reported in Revoltella (2001) for 1995 and Nivorozhkin (2003) for the period 
1994-1997. 
The countries we investigate are characterized by varying degrees of success with 
reforms. Poland, the Czech Republic and Estonia can be described as advanced transition 
economies (which is manifested in their EU accession status) while Bulgaria and Romania 
have had less success with reform and lagged behind the other countries in our group. The 
relative magnitude of leverage across countries suggests that the relative success with 
macroeconomic and institutional reforms is reflected in the availability of debt financing. 













An interesting question related to our study is whether the variation in the leverage of 
firms across countries varied in line with the capital market development and macroeconomic 
aggregates. We run several panel regressions of the mean leverage across countries and time 
                                                 
1 The denominator of the ratio would decrease if we use debt to shareholders’ equity. The nominator of the ratio 
can also increase, because total debt can exceed bank debt.   11
against a number of different variables that serve as proxies for capital market developments 
and general economic conditions in the countries considered.
2 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the magnitude of leverage in our sample is positively 
related to the domestic credit to private sector as a proportion of GDP and the ratio of 
domestic credit provided by banking sector as a proportion of GDP. The results can be 
interpreted as indicators that the samples of firms we investigate are likely to be 
representative for the general population of firms. Leverage is positively related to the 
solvency of the banking sector proxied by the ratio of bank liquid reserves to total assets and 
the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans. Firm leverage also responds positively 
to the size of the banking sector privatization, which is captured by the proportion of state-
owned bank assets in total banking assets. The higher economic growth of a country reflected 
in higher investments to GDP and the GDP per capita growth positively affects the leverage 
of firms. Inflation negatively affects the degree of leverage of firms. The greater inflow of 
foreign direct investments decreases the degree of leverage, which can be attributed to the 
reliance of companies on equity financing represented by FDI. The latter fact is supported by 


















                                                 
2 The explanatory variables are taken from the 2002 World Development Indicators CD-ROM provided by the 
World Bank and EBRD Transition Report 2002.   12
Table 1.  Panel regressions of mean values of leverage 
 

















INFL  -0.0022*** 
(-7.58) 
    
BankLR  0.0022*** 
(26.6) 
    





DCBS   0.0014*** 
(3.38) 
   
INVGDP   0.0069*** 
(8.34) 
   





FDI      -0.0025*** 
(-2.72) 
 
GDPPCG       0.003* 
(1.79) 
MCAP       -0.001* 
(-1.82) 
 R
2 = 0.66  R




Note: The dependent variable is the average ratio of debt to the sum of debt and shareholders’ equity (LEV). The 
explanatory variables are: domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP (CRTPS), bank liquid reserves to bank 
assets ratio (BankLR), the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans of banks (NPL), the share of state-
owned bank assets in total assets of banks (ASSOB), domestic credit of banking sector (DCBS), the ratio of 
investments to GDP (INVGDP), inflation, GDP deflator, annual % (INFL), foreign direct investment, net 
inflows, % of GDP (FDI), Market capitalization of listed companies, % of GDP (MCAP), and GDP per capita 
growth, annual % (GDPPCG). 
The models are estimated using within groups transformation (deviation from individual means). The data 
is a balanced panel. There are five cross-sectional groups and the time-series length is five years (1997-2001). 
 
 
IV.  Dynamic adjustment model of capital structure 
 
The dynamic adjustment model of capital structure of firms presented below is adopted from 
Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (1999) and Heshmati (2002). Firms in the model have 
endogenous leverage targets. Therefore, the actual financial leverage of firms can be inter-
temporally sub-optimal due to costly adjustments to the target leverage. 
   13
Let the target leverage ratio of a company i at time t, L*it, be determined by the following 
function: 
L*it = F (Yit, t),    (1) 
where Yit is a vector of firm specific variables, and t is the time trend. 
This specification insures that target leverage may vary across firms and over time due 
to variations in underlying factors. The fact that the target debt ratio of a particular firm can 
change over time stresses the dynamic aspect of the capital structure problem. 
A process of costly adjustment in a firm’s leverage is modelled by the following 
relationship: 
Lit - Li t-1 = δit (L*it - Li t-1),    (2) 
where δit is an adjustment parameter lying between zero and one. The parameter δit can be a 
function of several variables, including the previous year’s leverage. Lit and Lit-1 are observed 
leverage in year t and t-1, respectively. 
In the absence of capital market imperfections, the parameter δit would equal 1, 
implying that the change in actual leverage between two consecutive periods should be equal 
to the desired leverage. The imperfections mentioned above basically mean that it is costly for 
a firm to adjust to a target capital structure in the presence of market imperfections. 
We can rewrite equation (2) as: 
Lit = (1 - δit) Li t-1 + δit L*it   (3) 
L*it and δit can be assumed to have the following functional form: 
L*it  = b0 + Σj bj Yjit + Σt btt   (4) 
δit  = c0 + Σk ck Zkit + Σt ctt,   (5) 
where Yjit is a j
th factor at time t explaining the target leverage of firm i at time t, and Zjit is a 
k
th factor at time t explaining a speed of adjustment to the  target leverage of firm i at time t. 
Under our specification, a firm’s manager uses information at the end of period t to set 
the target leverage for the period, implying “perfect forecast” abilities of the manager. 
Alternatively, we may use information at time t-1, and assume that the manager is not 
forward-looking at all. The empirical results appear to be robust for either approach. 
 
 
V. Dependent  and  explanatory variables of the model 
 
We now consider factors influencing availability and level of debt financing, and factors 
affecting adjustment of companies to their target leverage. An appropriate measure of   14
financial leverage, given the scope of our study, the available data and the previous research 
on the issue (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995) is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt 
and shareholders’ equity (LEV). 
Based on the alternative theories of capital structure and previous empirical work in the 
area, we select the explanatory variables with a likely affect on target leverage of firms. 
The first explanatory variable is tangibility ( TANG) proxied by the proportion of 
tangible fixed assets in total assets. The higher proportion of tangible assets should be 
positively related to the availability of collateral. Greater collateral may alleviate the agency 
costs of debt.
3 The importance of collateral is greater for newly established businesses with no 
close ties to creditors. These arguments suggest a positive relationship between tangibility and 
target leverage.
4 Indeed, the results for developed countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988) uniformly confirm this. On the other hand, there are a number of 
factors limiting the importance of tangible assets as collateral in transition economies. First, 
underdeveloped and inefficient legal systems may hinder the creation of enforceable debt 
contracts. In case of default, the recovery of collateral may be costly and lengthy. Second, thin 
and illiquid secondary markets for firms’ assets create uncertainty about their “recoverable” 
market value. 
Another factor influencing the relationship of leverage and tangibility is the lack of 
long-term debt on the balance sheets of the companies in transition economies. If companies 
with a relatively more fixed tangible assets demand more long-term debt, and short-term debt 
is an imperfect substitute for long-term debt, the companies may end up with less total debt 
due to the shortage of long-term debt financing.  
This negative relationship between leverage and tangibility has been found in a number 
of previous studies of transition economies (e.g. Cornelli, Portes, Schaffer, 1998; 
Nivorozhkin, 2002). Based on the presented arguments, we expect to find a negative or 
neutral relationship between leverage and tangibility. 
Most capital structure studies argue that a firm’s size is a determinant of the optimal 
debt capacity (Warner, 1977; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Fixed direct bankruptcy costs 
would constitute a smaller proportion of a larger (more valuable) firm, and thus increase the 
firm’s target leverage. Moreover, a larger firm is likely to be better diversified, which would 
                                                 
3 This cost is related to the incentive of stockholders of leveraged firms to invest sub-optimally to expropriate 
wealth from the firm’s bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).    
4 The alternative theory [Grossman and Hart (1982)] explains the negative relationship based on the argument 
that an increased amount of uncollateralized (more risky) debt would increase monitoring by lenders. That would 
alleviate the conflict of interests between firm’s shareholders and self-interested managers. Given well-
publicized evidence of poor corporate governance structures in transition economies, we rule out this explanation 
of the relationship between tangibility and leverage.    15
reduce the probability of insolvency (and therefore the probability of incurring bankruptcy 
costs). The predicted relationship between target leverage and the firm’s size is again positive. 
The positive relationship between the size of a company and its leverage may be 
reinforced in transition economies. Larger firms may get a favourable treatment from the 
creditors and set up the higher leverage targets because of implicit (or explicit) “too-big-to-
fail” type guarantees from the authorities. Relatively higher “social” importance of a larger 
company would likely increase its chances of participating in a government-sponsored 
restructuring program and securing some form of “target financing.” There is also some 
evidence that the banks in most of the transition countries prefer to deal with larger clients 
due to the high fixed costs of monitoring and information collection. 
We use the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for company’s size (SIZE) and anticipate 
a positive relationship between size and debt targets. 
A firm’s age is usually chosen to proxy the exposure of its capital structure to the 
asymmetric information problem. Reputation formation takes time and reduces the risk-
shifting incentives of borrowers. The longer a firm survives in business, the more profits it 
can accumulate and subsequently use it to replace debt financing (Diamond, 1989). The 
above-mentioned factors would tend to decrease the firm’s target leverage. On the other hand, 
a firm’s age may proxy the firm’s experience in a particular business, and thus reflect its 
maturity. Greater business experience would tend to negatively affect the probability of 
bankruptcy and therefore result in higher leverage targets for older firms. The latter prediction 
is unlikely to apply to firms in transition economies, since experience before economic 
reforms is likely to be of limited value for such companies. 
We construct the variable AGE as the difference between the observation year and the 
year in which the firm was established. The expected relationship between firm’s age and its 
leverage targets is negative. 
In addition to using debt financing, firms may be financed by their suppliers. The 
literature (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1996) suggests that firms may rely more on trade credit 
when debt financing is unavailable. We control for the effect of trade credit on the target 
levels of debt by including the ratios of net trade credit to total assets (NTC). The evidence 
found for the industrial countries should be reinforced by the larger market imperfections in 
the credit markets of the transition countries. 
The theories of capital structure argue that market imperfections should lead to the 
relevance of a firm’s profitability for its choice of leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) present 
a simple version of a pecking-order theory, which predicts that, holding investments fixed, 
leverage is lower for more profitable firms, and given profitability, is higher for firms with   16
more investments. The prediction of the theory is a direct implication that the asymmetric 
information between the firm’s owners and outside investors creates the pecking order of 
finance with internal financing preferred to external financing, and debt preferred to outside 
equity. In a more complex view of the pecking-order argument (Myers, 1984), firms are 
concerned with both future and current financing costs. Firms with large expected 
investments may want to maintain a low-risk debt capacity to avoid passing up future 
investments or finance such investments with new risky securities. 
In contrast to the pecking-order theory, the static trade-off theory of capital structure 
views the choice of a firm’s leverage as a trade-off of expected bankruptcy costs and tax 
shields of debt. The theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and profitability, 
because higher profitability implies more income to shield. Since what matters for a firm is 
the expected realizable value of the tax shields on an extra dollar of promised future interest 
payments (Myers, 1999), tax shields have significant value only for companies with high and 
stable income. Given higher economic uncertainty in the transition countries, the latter 
argument may imply relatively low tax advantages of debt for firms. 
We use the ratio of income before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets as a proxy 
for company profitability (PROF), and expect to find a negative relationship. 
We calculate the standard deviation of operating income for each firm in the sample 
during the period 1997-2001 (VROA) to account for the effect of riskiness of the firm’s cash 
flow on the target level of debt financing. This income variability proxy does not directly 
relate to any theoretical result, but has been used in several empirical papers (e.g. Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Friend and Lang, 1988). On the supply side, the suppliers of funds are likely 
to control their credit risks by both a range of interest rates and prices and through credit 
rationing. Under these circumstances, higher income variability may lead to a lower level of 
indebtedness. On the demand side, the risk attitude of firms’ managers may have an effect on 
the relationship between volatility of income and target leverage. The potential financial 
distress implied by a higher variability of a firm’s income may lead a risk-averse manager to 
have relatively lower debt targets.
5 The weak insolvency laws and their enforcement in 
transition economies may result in a lower risk-aversion of the managers with the 
corresponding higher debt targets. Overall, the expected relationship between income 
variability and leverage targets is more likely to be negative in advanced transition countries.  
The firms in our sample represent a wide array of industries. Based on the first digit of 
their primary US SIC code we created dummy variables to control for the effect of industrial 
                                                 
5 The degree of a risk-aversion would be influenced by the personal wealth diversification of the manager, as 
well as the labor market conditions of the manager.   17
classification on the level of target debt ratio. The literature points to both the nature of the 
business of firms in various industries and the differences in regulation as responsible for “the 
industry effect” (Titman, 1984, Guedes and Opler, 1996). 
The degree of a financial leverage of companies is likely to be influenced by the extent 
of ownership concentration. Evidence from transition economies (see Hussain and 
Nivorozhkin, 1997, Kočenda and Svejnar, 2003) suggests higher ownership concentration 
tends to reduce financial leverage. One explanation for this phenomenon is that, given the 
supply-side imperfections in the credit markets of transition economies and virtual non-
existence of market for long-term debt, company demand for long-term financing is likely to 
be satisfied through an increase in equity capital. Taking into account the poor corporate 
governance structures of transition economies, large contributions to equity were more likely 
to be made by strategic investors using their large ownership stakes for control purposes. 
The degree of ownership concentration is accounted for with dummy variables.
6 
Variable OWN_A takes a value of 1 when the company has no recorded shareholder with an 
ownership over 24.9 % (either direct or total). It is 0 otherwise. Variable OWN_B takes a 
value of 1 when the company has no recorded shareholder with an ownership percentage 
(direct or total) over 49.9 %, but has one or more shareholders with an ownership percentage 
above 24.9 %. It is 0 otherwise. Variable OWN_C takes a value of 1 when the company has a 
recorded shareholder with an ownership (direct or total) over 49.9  %, and 0 otherwise. 
Variable OWN_U takes a value of 1 when the ownership concentration is unknown, and 0 
otherwise. The reference group for the ownership concentration dummies is OWN_A. 
Based on the presented arguments and empirical evidence, we expect to find a negative 
relationship between target leverage and ownership concentration.       
Most of the countries studied here enjoyed significant inflows of FDI during the period 
of study. We control for the effect of foreign ownership on the leverage targets of companies 
in our sample by including in the regressions a dummy variable FOR, which takes a value of 
1 if the ultimate owner of a company is foreign, and 0 otherwise. Because a foreign owner 
would likely be willing to exercise management and control over host country firms, we 
expect that the presence of strategic foreign investors would reduce the leverage targets of 
companies. 
The model adopted in this paper takes into account the fact that the adjustments of 
capital structure are likely to be costly and the adjustment costs may vary across firms and 
time. 
                                                 
6 These variables are based on the “Independence Indicator” constructed by the providers of the data we use to 
signify the degree of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders.   18
If the fixed costs of changing capital structure are important for companies, the speed of 
adjustment toward target leverage should depend on how far the firm is from the target. We 
include a variable DISTAN equal to the absolute value of difference between 
contemporaneous target leverage and lagged observed leverage, |L
*
it –Lit-1|.
  The speed of 
adjustment is expected to be higher the further away the company is from its target capital 
structure. 
The size of the firm would also likely to influence the speed of firms' adjustments to 
target leverage. This variable is supposed to test the presence of adjustment costs not captured 
by the variable DISTAN. The size of a firm could matter for the speed of adjustment, since 
fixed costs of changing capital structure are proportionally smaller for larger firms. The 
expected sign of this variable is positive. 
 
 
VI.  Data and estimation procedure 
 
The data used here are from the Amadeus database complied by Bureau Van Dyck (as of 
August 2003). Amadeus is a pan-European database of about 5 million public and private 
companies. Among other things, the data contain information from corporate annual balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts. Ownership information and industrial classification of 
companies are also provided. The data set tends to be highly representative for the largest 
companies in the countries. For the countries in this study, at least 95 % of companies satisfy 
one of the following criteria are included in the data set: (1) operating revenues greater than 
10 million euros; (2) total assets greater than 20 million euros; and (3) over 100 employees.
7   
Given the dynamic nature of our model, we selected companies with five consecutive 
years of reports and no missing statements. In addition, firms classified as financial 
intermediaries were removed from the sample due to their inappropriateness for testing the 
predictions of optimal capital structure models. Utilities and public administration 
organizations were excluded from the sample because their financial decisions are likely to be 
influenced by regulation.  
The final sample comprises 729 Bulgarian companies, 976 Czech companies, 311 
Estonian companies, 1,219 Polish companies and 2,477 Romanian companies. The data form 
a balanced panel for the period 1997-2001.  
                                                 
7 This information is posted at http://www.amadeus.bvdep.com.   19
Table 3 (Panel A -F) in Appendix provides summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables of the model. 
 
The model we estimate takes the following form: 
 
Lit = (1- δit) L it-1 + δit L*it + ηit ,    (6) 
 
where L it is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity (LEV), and ηit is an error term. 
The target ratio of debt to shareholders’ equity, L*it, and the speed of adjustment, δit, are 
modelled by the following linear relationships: 
 
L*it  = b0 + Σj bj Yjit + Σt btt + ΣsbsSIC   (7) 
δit  = c0 + Σj ck Zjit + Σt ctt + ΣscsSIC,   (8) 
 
where the vectors of explanatory variables, Yjit includes the following variables: 
 
-  income variability (VROA) 
- profitability  (PROF) 
- tangibility  (TANG) 
- size  (SIZE) 
- age  (AGE) 
-  net trade credits (NTCS) 
-  time dummies (T97-T01) 
-  industrial dummies (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4, IND5, IND6, IND7, IND8, 
IND9) 
-  ownership concentration dummies (OWN_B, OWN_C, OWN_U) 
-  Foreign ownership dummy (FOR). 
 
The vector Zjit includes: 
- distance  (DISTAN) 
- size  (SIZE) 
-  time dummies (T97-T01) 
-  US SIC dummies (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4, IND5, IND6, IND7, IND8, IND9) 
 
The dynamic model is estimated separately for each country using a non-linear 
regression procedure, specifically, the nonlinear regression procedure (PROC MODEL) of   20
SAS (Statistical Analysis System, release 8.02) to compute least squares estimates of the 
parameters of the nonlinear model. The modified Gauss-Newton method is used. Given 
equations (6), (7), and (8), the estimated equation is 
 
Lit = (1- (c0 + Σj ck Zjit + Σt ctt + ΣscsSIC)) L it-1 +  
(c0 + Σj ck Zjit + Σt ctt + ΣscsSIC)(b0 + Σj bjYjit+Σt btt + ΣsbsSIC) + ηit .  (9) 
 
The model is flexible and allows possible negative estimates of the firms’ target leverage. 
These negative values were replaced by 0 in each iteration before calculating the distance 
between the target leverage in period t and observed leverage in period t-1.  
 
 
VII.   Results 
 
Our results (see Table 4 in Appendix) indicate that higher operating profit variability has a 
positive or neutral effect on the debt targets of companies. The coefficient of variable VROA 
is positive for Poland and Romania and Estonia and insignificant for the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria. The results for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria differ from the negative and 
positive relationship found for those countries in the period 1993-1997 in Nivorozhkin 
(2003). The empirical evidence on the relationship between operating profit variability and 
target leverage in EU countries is mixed. Banerjee, Hesmati and Wihlborg (1999) obtain 
negative coefficients for this variable in the sample of the UK companies, Wald (1999) 
reports a negative coefficient between the earnings variance and leverage for Germany, 
positive coefficients for UK, and a positive, but insignificant, result for France.  
The tangibility of company fixed assets (TANG) appears to have mixed effects on the 
debt targets across countries. The relationship is negative for Bulgaria and Romania, which is 
in line with the evidence from previous studies on the transition economies (Cornelli, Portes, 
and Schaffer, 1996; Nivorozhkin, 2001, 2003). Nevertheless, the coefficient of variable TANG 
is positive for the Czech Republic and Hungary and insignificant for Poland. The results 
imply that although tangible assets remain a poor source of collateral in less advanced 
transition economies, the effect of tangibility on target leverage is moving towards the 
positive relationship observed in Germany, France, Italy and the UK (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995).   21
The profitability of companies has a uniform effect on target leverage across all 
countries considered. The coefficient of variable PROF is negative and significant in all 
regressions. The results are in line with evidence for the EU (and other developed countries) 
and support the pecking-order theory of finance. Firms lacking internal funds would like to 
close the gap by setting higher debt targets. If the more profitable companies in our sample 
also have higher growth prospects, the observed relationship is consistent with a story that 
firms going public may issue increased equity in anticipation of future investments (Fama and 
French, 2002). This situation is especially appealing for the newly privatized enterprises in 
transition economies. 
Firm size is positively and significantly related to target leverage in all countries, except 
Estonia and Poland, where the relationship is not significant. The effect of firm size on 
leverage tends to vary across EU countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) 
report a negative relationship for Germany, a positive one for UK and an insignificant one for 
France and Italy. 
In the countries considered, the positive effect of firm size on leverage target can likely 
be explained by the fact that size serves as a stability proxy for creditors. Larger companies 
are also the likely targets of government bailouts due to the higher and more visible social 
costs imposed by their distress. Larger companies are also often subject to some form of 
government-sponsored investment programs. The financing within these programs can take 
the form of guarantees and direct financing. 
The age of a firm has a significant and negative effect on its target leverage in all 
countries under investigation. The results are in line with our expectations supporting the 
hypothesis of the reputation effect in alleviating the asymmetric information costs for firms’ 
choice of financing. 
The effect of net trade credits on a firm’s leverage targets is negative as expected in all 
countries, except Bulgaria and Romania, where it is not significant. The results may indicate 
substitution between intermediated debt and trade credits in advanced transition economies. 
The increase in ownership concentration (i.e. decrease in independence) had no 
significant effect on the target leverage in all countries, except Estonia and Bulgaria.
8 In 
Estonia and Bulgaria, the presence of a shareholder with the ownership stake over 49.9 % 
resulted in the lower leverage targets relative to companies where there the largest 
shareholders had stakes greater than 24.9 %, but less than 49.9 %. 
                                                 
8 Note the large number of companies with unknown degree of independence in the Estonian sample.    22
The foreign origin of the ultimate owner of a company decreased the leverage target of 
Bulgarian firms, and increased the leverage targets of Czech and Estonian firms. 
As expected, the speed of adjustment of a firm’s leverage tended to increase as the 
distance to the target leverage increased. The relationship between speed of adjustment and 
the variable DISTAN is significant in all countries, except Poland. The results indicate that the 
large adjustments of leverage tend to be less costly relative to smaller ones, which suggests 
the presence of fixed costs in changing the capital structure of a firm. 
Contrary to our expectations, the effect of a company size on the speed of adjustment to 
the target leverage did not support our hypothesis of relatively smaller adjustment costs for 
larger companies. The effect was negative and significant for Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania. 
A positive significant relationship was only observed for Poland. One possible explanation for 
the obtained results is supply side imperfections in lending policies. Since lending to a larger 
firm usually implies a higher exposure for a bank, larger companies may be unable to adjust 
as fast as smaller companies.
9 
The speed of capital structure adjustment of the companies in the first quintile (smallest 
companies) is 5-8 % greater than the speed of adjustment of companies in the fifth quintile 
(largest companies) for Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania. The largest companies in Poland 
adjusted 8  % faster than the smallest companies (see Table 5, Panel A, B, and C in 
Appendix). The speed of adjustment tends to remain relatively stable over time in all 
countries, except Bulgaria, where we observe a three-fold decreased in average speed of 
adjustment. The difference between mean and median speed of adjustment indicates that the 
unconditional distribution of adjustment speed is approximately symmetric in every year of 
the observation period. 
During all years, the observed mean levels of leverage exceeded the target mean levels 
of leverage in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. The opposite was observed in the Czech 
Republic and Estonia (see Table 5, Panel A, B, and C in Appendix). The average gap between 
observed and target leverage ranges from –11 % in the Czech Republic in 2000 to 17 % in 
Poland in 1998. The gap also varies significantly across size groups, although we observe no 
consistent patterns.    
Table 2 reports the results of regressions of mean target leverage across countries on the 
variables serving as proxies for credit market and general economic conditions in the 
countries. The explanatory variables are the same as in regressions of mean observed leverage 
reported in Table 1.  
                                                 
9  Syndicated lending is likely non-existent in the economies we consider.   23
The comparison of results in Table 1 and 2 reveals that the variation in actual leverage 
is better explained by the variation in explanatory variables relative to the variation in target 
leverage. 
 
Table 2.  Panel regressions of mean target values of leverage 

















INFL  -0.004*** 
(-4.93) 
    
BankLR  0.002*** 
(4.07) 
    





DCBS   0.003 
(1.10) 
   
INVGDP   0.012*** 
(3.16) 
   





FDI      -0.006 
(-1.49) 
 
GDPPCG       0.005*** 
(3.87) 
MCAP       -0.005*** 
(-10.00) 
 R
2 = 0.34  R




Note: The dependent variable is the average ratio of debt to the sum of debt and shareholders’ equity (LEV). The 
explanatory variables are: domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP (CRTPS), bank liquid reserves to bank 
assets ratio (BankLR), the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans of banks (NPL), the share of state-
owned bank assets in total assets of banks (ASSOB), domestic credit of banking sector (DCBS), the ratio of 
investments to GDP (INVGDP), inflation, GDP deflator, annual % (INFL), foreign direct investment, net 
inflows, % of GDP (FDI), Market capitalization of listed companies, % of GDP (MCAP), and GDP per capita 
growth, annual % (GDPPCG). 
The models are estimated using within groups transformation (deviation from individual means). The data 
is a balanced panel. There are five cross-sectional groups and the time-series length is five years (1997-2001). 
 
The signs of the relationships are the same, although the significance is higher in the 
regressions with actual leverage. These results may indicate that supply-side imperfections 
play an important role in a firm’s choice of capital structure. These supply-side variables were 
not explicitly included in the target leverage equation of our model and this could potentially 
contribute to the observed differences between actual and target leverage in the model. 
Notably, the results in Table 1 and 2 differ significantly for some variables serving as proxies   24
for the solvency of the banking sector. The changes in these variables are often hard to predict 
given the opaque nature of the banking business and the importance of government prudential 
regulation in the banking sector. 
 
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 
We presented evidence on the actual and target capital structures of firms in five EU 
accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Estonia). We provided insights into the financial 
constraints facing private companies and compared the level of indebtedness and the 
determinants of firms’ choice of capital structure in selected EU accession countries and EU 
countries. 
On average, the leverage of companies in the transition countries remained lower than 
in EU countries. Nevertheless, the average levels of indebtedness of companies in advanced 
transition economies of Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic were close to those observed 
in several EU countries. 
Despite the remaining differences in the capital structures of firms across EU accession 
countries, there was a significant convergence in the average level of firms’ leverage across 
countries studied. The average indebtedness of firms in the countries with highest leverage 
decreased, while the average indebtedness of firms in the countries with lower leverage 
increased. 
At the aggregate level, developments in credit markets and the general economic 
environment in the countries studied explain the variation in firm indebtedness. 
The determinants of target capital structure in the cross-section of firms also vary across 
countries. The only variables with a uniform effect on target leverage for all countries are the 
company’s profitability and age. More profitable companies tend to borrow less, which 
supports the pecking-order theory of finance. The positive effect of the firm’s age on the 
leverage targets provides the support for the hypothesis of the positive effect of reputation in 
firms’ choice of financing. 
The dynamic adjustment model adopted in this paper illustrates the importance of 
recognition of intertemporal sub-optimality in the firm’s capital structure and the costly nature 
of adjustment to the target leverage. In line with our expectations, the large adjustments of 
leverage tend to be less costly relative to smaller ones, indicating the presence of fixed costs   25
in changing the capital structure of a firm. Contrary to our expectations, the speed of leverage 
adjustment tended to decrease with an increase in firm size, indicating potential supply-side 
imperfections from the exposure control of providers of debt financing. 
Overall, the evidence showed that the capital structures of firms in EU accession 
countries have tended to converge and gradually approach the leverage levels observed in EU 
countries. Continuing progress in reform of corporate finance in transition economies will 
likely depend on whether these countries achieve macroeconomic stability and success in 
broad institutional reforms.   26
Appendix 
 
Table 3.  Summary statistics of the capital structure data set 
 
A. Bulgaria 
Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
LEV 3645 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.99 
TANG 3645 0.50 0.23 0.00 0.99 
PROF 3645 0.12 0.16 -0.75 1.42 
VROA 3645 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.51 
SIZE 3645 14.84 1.56 9.99 20.68 
NTC 3645 0.08 0.20 -0.81 0.93 
AGE 3645 27.29 24.61 1.00 167.00 
IND0 3645 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IND1 3645 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
IND2 3645 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
IND3 3645 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
IND4 3645 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
IND5 3645 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
IND6 3645 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
IND7 3645 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
IND8 3645 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
IND9 3645 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
OWN_A 3645 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
OWN_B 3645 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
OWN_C 3645 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
OWN_U 3645 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
FOR 3645 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
 
B. Czech Republic 
Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
LEV 4880 0.29 0.27 0.00 1.00 
TANG 4880 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.99 
PROF 4880 0.12 0.11 -0.60 0.90 
VROA 4880 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.35 
SIZE 4880 12.25 1.32 8.01 18.80 
NTC 4880 0.02 0.18 -0.99 0.90 
AGE 4880 7.47 4.85 0.00 51.00 
IND0 4880 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
IND1 4880 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
IND2 4880 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
IND3 4880 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
IND4 4880 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
IND5 4880 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
IND6 4880 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IND7 4880 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IND8 4880 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
IND9 4880 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
OWN_A 4880 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
OWN_B 4880 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
OWN_C 4880 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
OWN_U 4880 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
FOR 4880 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 







Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
LEV 1555 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.99 
TANG 1555 0.42 0.24 0.00 1.00 
PROF 1555 0.16 0.15 -0.74 0.95 
VROA 1555 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.53 
SIZE 1555 17.36 1.43 9.46 20.60 
NTC 1555 0.03 0.20 -0.79 0.86 
AGE 1555 15.01 20.78 0.00 103.00 
IND0 1555 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IND1 1555 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
IND2 1555 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
IND3 1555 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
IND4 1555 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IND5 1555 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
IND6 1555 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
IND7 1555 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IND8 1555 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IND9 1555 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
OWN_A 1555 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OWN_B 1555 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
OWN_C 1555 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
OWN_U 1555 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 





Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
LEV 6095 0.24 0.25 0.00 0.99 
TANG 6095 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.99 
PROF 6095 0.10 0.15 -0.61 1.47 
VROA 6095 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.56 
SIZE 6095 10.13 1.10 6.98 16.97 
NTC 6095 -0.06 0.17 -0.82 0.87 
AGE 6095 29.71 43.96 0.00 760.00 
IND0 6095 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
IND1 6095 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
IND2 6095 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
IND3 6095 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
IND4 6095 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
IND5 6095 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
IND6 6095 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
IND7 6095 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
IND8 6095 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IND9 6095 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
OWN_A 6095 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
OWN_B 6095 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
OWN_C 6095 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
OWN_U 6095 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 





Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
LEV 12385 0.19 0.23 0.00 1.00 
TANG 12385 0.42 0.21 0.00 1.00 
PROF 12385 0.21 0.21 -0.84 2.88 
VROA 12385 0.12 0.08 0.00 1.13 
SIZE 12385 16.71 1.54 8.24 21.05 
NTC 12385 -0.02 0.20 -0.84 0.93 
AGE 12385 6.76 2.23 0.00 11.00 
IND0 12385 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
IND1 12385 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
IND2 12385 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
IND3 12385 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
IND4 12385 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
IND5 12385 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
IND6 12385 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
IND7 12385 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
IND8 12385 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IND9 12385 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
OWN_A 12385 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
OWN_B 12385 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
OWN_C 12385 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
OWN_U 12385 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
FOR 12385 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
   29
 
Table 4.  Dynamic Adjustment Model 
 
A. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic  
Bulgaria Czech  Republic 
Parameter Estimate t  Value Pr>|t| Parameter  Estimate t  Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept  -0.39 -4.32  <.0001 Intercept  0.17 0.91  0.36 
VROA  0.02 0.22  0.83  VROA  0.15 0.62  0.54 
TANG  -0.21 -6.04  <.0001 TANG  0.19 3.19  0.00 
PROF  -0.31 -5.44  <.0001 PROF  -1.72 -14.67  <.0001 
SIZE  0.04 6.94  <.0001 SIZE  0.02 2.01  0.04 
NTC  -0.03 -0.96  0.34  NTC  -0.50 -6.89  <.0001 
AGE  0.00 -7.57  <.0001 AGE  -0.01 -4.33  <.0001 
T99  0.05 2.24  0.03  T99  -0.04 -1.10  0.27 
T00  0.00 0.11  0.92  T00  -0.14 -3.09  0.00 
T01  0.07 2.97  0.00  T01  -0.14 -3.26  0.00 
IND1  0.28 6.61  <.0001 IND1  0.01 0.10  0.92 
IND2  0.17 4.02  <.0001 IND2  0.10 1.03  0.30 
IND3  0.16 3.24  0.00 IND3  0.09 0.89  0.38 
IND4  0.09 1.98  0.05 IND4  -0.09 -0.70  0.48 
IND5  0.20 4.78  <.0001 IND5  0.13 1.29  0.20 
IND6  0.28 5.45  <.0001 IND6  -0.05 -0.42  0.68 
IND7  0.14 2.45  0.01 IND7  0.10 0.96  0.34 
IND8  -0.03 -0.04  0.97  IND8  . .  . 
IND9  0.11 1.59  0.11 IND9  0.15 0.67  0.50 
OWN_B  0.04 1.25  0.21  OWN_B  0.01 0.12  0.91 
OWN_C  -0.02 -0.64  0.52  OWN_C  -0.06 -0.63  0.53 
OWN_U  -0.04 -0.92  0.36  OWN_U  -0.04 -0.37  0.71 
FOR  -0.07 -1.77  0.08  FOR  0.14 3.57  0.00 
Intercept  0.51 3.37  0.00  Intercept  0.01 0.19  0.85 
DISTAN  0.63 7.00  <.0001 DISTAN  0.16 7.04  <.0001 
SIZE  -0.02 -2.10  0.04  SIZE  0.00 -0.94  0.35 
T99  -0.12 -3.44  0.00  T99  0.01 1.00  0.32 
T00  -0.08 -2.45  0.01  T00  0.01 0.30  0.76 
T01  -0.18 -5.10  <.0001 T01  0.03 1.49  0.14 
IND1  -0.19 -1.84  0.07  IND1  0.06 2.10  0.04 
IND2  -0.04 -0.42  0.67  IND2  0.07 2.67  0.01 
IND3  -0.08 -0.73  0.46  IND3  0.09 2.97  0.00 
IND4  -0.05 -0.48  0.63  IND4  0.03 0.77  0.44 
IND5  -0.04 -0.35  0.73  IND5  0.08 2.84  0.00 
IND6  -0.17 -1.56  0.12  IND6  0.06 1.69  0.09 
IND7  -0.21 -1.84  0.07  IND7  0.06 2.04  0.04 
IND8  -0.17 -0.09  0.93  IND8  . .  . 
IND9  0.09 0.46  0.65 IND9  0.06 0.70  0.49   30
Table 4.  Dynamic Adjustment Model (cont.) 
 
B. Estonia and Poland 
Estonia Poland 
Parameter Estimate t  Value Pr>|t| Parameter Estimate t  Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept  -1.72 -2.66  0.01  Intercept  0.20 0.82  0.41 
VROA  0.37 1.74  0.08  VROA  1.01 4.57  <.0001 
TANG  0.38 5.24  <.0001  TANG  -0.04 -0.59  0.56 
PROF  -1.35 -10.27  <.0001 PROF  -1.67 -12.38  <.0001 
SIZE  0.01 0.84  0.40 SIZE  0.00 -0.05  0.96 
NTC  -0.21 -2.32  0.02  NTC  -0.18 -2.33  0.02 
AGE  0.00 -3.68  0.00  AGE  0.00 -3.32  0.00 
T99  -0.11 -2.57  0.01  T99  -0.17 -4.34  <.0001 
T00  -0.12 -2.53  0.01  T00  -0.12 -2.92  0.00 
T01  -0.15 -2.84  0.00  T01  -0.24 -5.76  <.0001 
IND1  1.90 3.18  0.00 IND1  0.27 1.68  0.09 
IND2  1.91 3.17  0.00 IND2  0.23 1.39  0.17 
IND3  1.86 3.10  0.00 IND3  0.10 0.58  0.56 
IND4  1.87 3.11  0.00 IND4  0.20 1.18  0.24 
IND5  1.93 3.22  0.00 IND5  0.32 1.94  0.05 
IND6  1.89 3.15  0.00 IND6  0.08 0.49  0.62 
IND7  1.92 3.19  0.00 IND7  0.22 1.07  0.29 
IND9  2.02 3.31  0.00 IND9  0.22 0.98  0.33 
OWN_B  . .  .  OWN_B  0.16 1.06  0.29 
OWN_C  -0.33 -1.93  0.05  OWN_C  0.11 0.80  0.42 
OWN_U  0.07 0.48  0.63  OWN_U  0.16 1.16  0.25 
FOR  0.37 3.12  0.00 FOR  -0.03 -0.72  0.47 
Intercept  0.12 0.79  0.43  Intercept  -0.20 -2.88  0.00 
DISTAN  0.13 3.20  0.00  DISTAN  0.00 -0.09  0.93 
SIZE  -0.02 -2.65  0.01  SIZE  0.03 5.37  <.0001 
T99  0.04 1.58  0.11  T99  0.01 0.55  0.58 
T00  0.01 0.30  0.77  T00  -0.01 -0.34  0.73 
T01  -0.04 -1.66  0.10  T01  -0.02 -1.06  0.29 
IND1  0.49 7.59  <.0001  IND1  0.07 1.65  0.10 
IND2  0.41 6.36  <.0001  IND2  0.03 0.69  0.49 
IND3  0.49 6.88  <.0001  IND3  0.09 1.90  0.06 
IND4  0.41 5.16  <.0001  IND4  0.06 1.29  0.20 
IND5  0.40 6.69  <.0001  IND5  0.08 1.93  0.05 
IND6  0.28 4.40  <.0001  IND6  0.07 1.47  0.14 
IND7  0.47 5.77  <.0001  IND7  -0.01 -0.21  0.84 
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Parameter Estimate t  Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept  0.30 3.76  0.00 
VROA  0.18 2.65  0.01 
TANG  -0.25 -8.56  <.0001
PROF  -0.32 -9.89  <.0001
SIZE  0.01 2.69  0.01 
NTC  0.02 0.71  0.48 
AGE  -0.01 -4.19  <.0001
T99  0.03 1.97  0.05 
T00  0.06 2.98  0.00 
T01  0.04 2.33  0.02 
IND1  0.00 -0.13  0.90 
IND2  -0.01 -0.23  0.82 
IND3  -0.01 -0.36  0.72 
IND4  -0.12 -3.66  0.00 
IND5  0.03 0.78  0.43 
IND6  0.09 1.58  0.11 
IND7  -0.12 -2.97  0.00 
IND9  -0.07 -0.43  0.66 
OWN_B  0.01 0.25  0.80 
OWN_C  0.02 1.27  0.20 
OWN_U  -0.04 -0.96  0.34 
FOR  0.02 1.21  0.23 
Intercept  0.36 4.33  <.0001
DISTAN  0.23 4.58  <.0001
SIZE  -0.01 -2.28  0.02 
T99  -0.01 -0.63  0.53 
T00  -0.06 -2.89  0.00 
T01  -0.01 -0.73  0.47 
IND1  0.02 0.63  0.53 
IND2  -0.05 -1.17  0.24 
IND3  -0.03 -0.75  0.45 
IND4  0.12 2.80  0.01 
IND5  -0.02 -0.40  0.69 
IND6  -0.09 -1.91  0.06 
IND7  0.05 1.03  0.31 
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Table 5.  Mean and median of adjustment speed (δit), target leverage ratio (L*it), ob-
served leverage ratio (Lit), and a gap between target and observed ratios (L*it-Lit)  
 





























BUL Very  small  0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.08
BUL Small  0.23 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.06
BUL Medium  0.21 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.09
BUL Large  0.20 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.09
BUL Very  Large  0.18 0.23 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.09
CZ Very  small  0.08 0.16 0.23 -0.07 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.00
CZ Small  0.07 0.21 0.28 -0.07 0.07 0.19 0.20 -0.03
CZ Medium  0.07 0.22 0.28 -0.06 0.07 0.21 0.24 -0.03
CZ Large  0.07 0.27 0.34 -0.06 0.07 0.26 0.30 -0.03
CZ Very  Large  0.07 0.32 0.30 0.02 0.07 0.32 0.27 0.03
EST Very  small  0.24 0.26 0.27 -0.01 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.00
EST Small  0.20 0.23 0.30 -0.06 0.23 0.22 0.23 -0.06
EST Medium  0.20 0.26 0.35 -0.09 0.22 0.24 0.31 -0.10
EST Large  0.17 0.28 0.33 -0.05 0.20 0.27 0.30 -0.07
EST Very  Large  0.16 0.29 0.31 -0.02 0.17 0.28 0.28 -0.02
POL Very  small  0.11 0.33 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.14
POL Small  0.13 0.33 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.13 0.12
POL Medium  0.14 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.13
POL Large  0.16 0.35 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.11
POL Very  Large  0.20 0.35 0.28 0.07 0.20 0.34 0.21 0.08
ROM Very  small  0.29 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.28 0.23 0.00 0.12
ROM Small  0.26 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.13
ROM Medium  0.24 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.12
ROM Large  0.22 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.13 0.13
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Table 5.  Mean and median of adjustment speed (δit), target leverage ratio (L*it), ob-
served leverage ratio (Lit), and a gap between target and observed ratios (L*it-Lit), 
(cont.) 
 
C. Year of observation 
 

























BUL 1997  0.31 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.05
BUL 1998  0.27 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.06
BUL 1999  0.17 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.11
BUL 2000  0.18 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.07
BUL 2001  0.11 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.02 0.13
CZ 1997  0.07 0.31 0.31 -0.01 0.07 0.32 0.25 0.01
CZ 1998  0.07 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.25 0.02
CZ 1999  0.08 0.26 0.29 -0.03 0.08 0.26 0.23 0.00
CZ 2000  0.07 0.16 0.27 -0.11 0.06 0.14 0.21 -0.05
CZ 2001  0.09 0.15 0.25 -0.10 0.08 0.13 0.20 -0.05
EST 1997  0.20 0.32 0.33 -0.01 0.23 0.33 0.30 -0.03
EST 1998  0.20 0.33 0.34 -0.01 0.22 0.34 0.31 -0.03
EST 1999  0.23 0.25 0.31 -0.07 0.25 0.25 0.27 -0.06
EST 2000  0.20 0.21 0.29 -0.07 0.22 0.20 0.22 -0.06
EST 2001  0.14 0.20 0.27 -0.08 0.16 0.19 0.22 -0.06
POL 1997  0.14 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.38 0.12 0.18
POL 1998  0.15 0.41 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.42 0.15 0.20
POL 1999  0.16 0.30 0.24 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.14 0.07
POL 2000  0.15 0.36 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.37 0.18 0.13
POL 2001  0.14 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.18 0.03
ROM 1997  0.27 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.26 0.23 0.04 0.13
ROM 1998  0.26 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.12
ROM 1999  0.25 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.24 0.27 0.10 0.13
ROM 2000  0.20 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.19 0.29 0.11 0.14
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